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                                 ON THE RECORD 
                            PADDY ASHDOWN INTERVIEW     
 
RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION BBC-1                                 DATE:   8.2.98 
................................................................................
 
JOHN HUMPHRYS:                         Good afternoon Mr Ashdown. 
 
PADDY ASHDOWN MP:                      Good afternoon John.  Nice to be with 
you. 
 
HUMPHRYS:                              And thank you for joining us.  Would you 
attack Iraq, given what you know about the situation as it stands today? 
 
ASHDOWN:                               Not now because there's diplomatic 
avenues yet to be explored but if at the end of those Saddam Hussein still 
flouts International Law which he has done, thumbs his nose at the 
international community, then there is no option but to take the military force 
necessary to ensure that he does not do that with impunity.  Now, nobody 
welcomes a war.  It carries with it great risks but and indeed some of those 
have been articulated very clearly in the newspaper.  But the fact of the 
matter is this: what happens if Saddam Hussein does not give in and accept 
International Law on this matter?  What happens is that given his record it is 
inevitable in my view that the appalling weapons of mass destruction which he's 
accumulated will, in due course be used, and the consequences for international 
peace will be even greater; and secondly that any attempt to enforce 
International Law in respect of other international terrorists like Saddam 
Hussein, will then be blown out of the window.    
 
                                      And the consequences for world peace 
therefore, and for the peace of the Middle East will be far far greater.  John 
Cousavitz, the great Nineteenth Century military philosopher said that war was 
diplomacy pursued by other means and what we need to have is a diplomatic 
campaign.   I cannot yet see a really diplomatic campaign.  I can see a number 
of diplomatic events going on at present but a diplomatic campaign to pursuade 
Saddam Hussein that he must accept International Law, that ought to proceed in 
a series of graduated and rational steps.  Each of those steps should have a 
clear threshold and each of them should have a signpost pointing how he can get 
out and what will happen if he does.  If at the end of that process he has been 
seen to be taken through each of those diplomatic steps and he still flouts 
International Law then there is no option but to use force. 
                                           
HUMPHRYS:                              But, you've used the expression "the 
military force necessary".  What does that mean because this is what is 
puzzling many people?  What is, in this context, necessary military force? 
 
ASHDOWN:                               Well look, I think the first thing the 
Government and there are three things I believe the Government has to do and 
the United States has to do.  Thing Number One is to tell us all - and not just 
Britain - I think British public opinion is very robust in these matters...- 
 
HUMPHRYS:                              We'll see, we'll see.  We don't know 
that yet do we? 
 
ASHDOWN:                               No.  It always has been in the past 
John.  I mean, you know in the Gulf War, in the Falklands War, in Bosnia, the 
British public opinion actually is rather more robust than many of the 
politicians.  Certainly in the Bosnian War as you will recall.  But at all 
events the international community must understand why it is necessary.  I'm 
delighted the Government has started to take those steps, though it would 
useful I think if this was an international campaign rather than just a British 
and American one, saying how appalling these weapons Saddam Hussein has.  
Secondly it is necessary to establish a clear aim.  There is a rule about 
military action, and the rule is this: that if you commit military action and 
you commit forces to the ground without a clear aim, the consequence is almost 
always political disaster, and probably unnecessary and very bad loss of life.  
And the third is there has to be with international support, a natural, 
rational progress of diplomatic actions, so as to investigate every realistic 
diplomatic avenue before taking the option of force.  

                                       Now, those three things need to be in 
place and I think they're coming into place.  And if you look at the next,
perhaps, the next ten days, perhaps two weeks, there is time to follow that 
pursuit.  I have one major concern, however, and that is that at the moment I 
cannot yet see a clear aim.  The Government and the United States tells us the 
aim is to bomb access for the UN Inspectors, to open the door for them to get 
where they want to.  I don't think that is a realistic aim.  I think there is a 
realistic aim - it's a half way between a mixture perhaps of prevention on the 
one hand and punishment on the other.  That we could for instance prevent him 
from using his facilities to produce more of these appalling weapons, to attack 
the installations that produce them, and therefore reduce his capacity.  And 
beyond that it is perfectly legitimate and achievable as a military aim to 
ensure that Saddam Hussein understands that he cannot with immunity get away 
with what he has done, and therefore to reduce his other military assets. 
 
HUMPHRYS:                              Right.  
 
ASHDOWN:                               For instance in the Republican Guard.  
Now those are perfectly fair aims, achievable aims, and that's the kind of 
thing I wish we'd fully mapped out.     
 
HUMPHRYS:                              But you-you-you raise exactly the point 
that I was going to put to you, this clear aim.  And let's look at the aim as 
we understand it, as expressed by Mr Blair and Mr Clinton.  And that is to stop 
him producing those chemical and biological weapons.  That's what this is meant 
to be all about.  Now, from a military point of view how do you do that, given 
the we don't even know where they are? 
 
ASHDOWN:                               Well, that's a matter for the military 
advisers.  And I'm sure that- 
 
HUMPHRYS:                              Well, it's crucial isn't it? 
 
ASHDOWN:                               Well, you and I can't second guess that 
John, and we shouldn't try. 
 
HUMPHRYS:                              Hang on, let me just stop in a moment... 
 
ASHDOWN:                               Well, if I can just answer your 
question, perhaps you'll understand.  Actually, I think there has been a subtle 
change.  You'll recall that at Prime Minister's Question last week the Prime 
Minister said the aim was to ensure that the UN inspectors got back in.  Well, 
I think when I heard the Prime Minister and President Clinton they were saying: 
if we can achieve that well and good, but it would be a legitimate aim to 
reduce his capacity to produce these as well. I think that is perfectly 
possible, as a military aim. I think in addition you can add an element of 
punishment to it to reduce his other general military assets, his conventional 
arms.  I think it is impossible, let's recognise this, it would be impossible 
to use air power to destroy every last chemical warhead tucked into a basement 
in a Mosque in downtown Baghdad. That's impossible and we shouldn't pretend 
otherwise. But to reduce the capacity to be able to produce these in the 
quantities that he has, and in particular to be able to get at and reduce or 
destroy the delivery systems which are vital, could well be, probably is, a 
perfectly acceptable and achievable military aim.     
 
HUMPHRYS:                              But let's take you back a little bit. 
The reason, as we all know, why the inspectors are..were sent in there in the 
first place, was to stop him producing these dreadful weapons.  They failed in 
that objective, they did a lot, as I'm sure you will tell me, eighty per cent 
they say of his perceived weaponry were sorted out and they knew where it was. 
Now, there's still a lot left. We don't know exactly how much - and it's 
precisely because we don't know how much - because we don't know where it is, 
because we don't know what state it's in, that this whole operation is 
necessary.   Now, given that that is the case and nobody denies that that is 
the case, otherwise there would have been no point in having the inspectors 
there in the first place...                 
 
ASHDOWN:                               Correct.  
 
HUMPHRYS:                           .. given that that is the situation, how 
can we possibly bomb those installations.  
 
ASHDOWN:                               You and I can play interesting 
television games...  
 
HUMPHRYS:                              No, no, this is not a game.  
 
ASHDOWN:                               Speculating, no it isn't a game, but 
that's the point. We can play all sort of games speculating about what 
intelligence there is, what weapons are available.  
 
HUMPHRYS:                              No, no, but.  
 
ASHDOWN:                               But John if you give me a moment, I'll 
try and answer your question.   
 
                                       You have to accept and I'm sure you 
would, that an inspector - confined necessarily to the areas of, for instance 
Iraq, that they've been allowed to go - and that's one of the reasons why this 
action has been taken, is not going to have access to a lot of sites which, for 
instance, would be quite visible from ariel reconnaissance. So the fact that 
the inspectors haven't been able to identify some sites does not necessarily 
mean that that intelligence is not available and those sites aren't available 
to be attacked.  You know a weapon can..a warhead can be hidden, can be hidden 
in the basement of a Mosque, or in the basement of a royal palace as some 
suspect. But the military, the industrial complexes to produce those are much 
more visible and in particular much more visible from the air.  
 
                                       But, look, let me just address this 
point. I think one thing which has not yet been fully, perhaps, taken into 
account, is that the moment this military action starts and I hope it can yet 
be avoided and I don't personally believe that that door is yet closed to us, 
providing we can assemble international support for the kind of diplomatic 
steps that I've taken.  The moment you take military action, you cross a 
threshold and it could well be that at that point, we will have decided that 
the attempt to control Saddam Hussein's capacity to produce weapons of mass 
destruction through the United Nations, may well have comprehensively ended. 
And from that moment onwards, we may have to do it by military means.  It does 
seem to be unlikely that after you have launched such a military action, and I 
hope it won't happen, that we can then restore UN inspection. That's seems to 
me inherently unlikely and I think we should be talking about what happens when 
you cross that threshold because that's not an event that just goes on for a 
week or a couple of weeks for a bombing campaign. It may be an event of much 
longer consequences.                     
 
                                       And the second point we need to think 
about is that if you do reduce Saddam Hussein's other military assets, for 
instance the Republican Guard, for instance his other strategic assets, his 
command and communications systems, are you then creating a vacuum in Iraq, 
into which you might find greater instability coming.  Now, those are very 
difficult issues.  What I am clear about, however, is that the risks attached 
to those actions, and I've nominated some of them, are less than the risks of 
being seen to back down in the face of Saddam Hussein's intransigence, allow 
him to flout international law, allow him to accumulate and in due course use 
these devasting weapons with appalling consequences and allow the whole 
framework of international law, into which we have invested so much, to be 
eroded against future use in similar circumstances.  
 
HUMPHRYS:                              Let me pick up the first of those two 
points, then.  What you seem to be saying - correct me if I'm wrong - is that 
once we've taken military action - and, commonsense would certainly suggest 
this - it's highly unlikely that Saddam will then say: well, alright, you guys 
can send your inspectors in now.  
 
                                       So, that bit of the operation, in a 
sense, has come to an end.  What we're then talking about doing is attempting 
to wipe out militarily the weapons producing equipment and factories, or 
whatever the heck he's got over there.  Now, is that - I mean you say we could 
get a lot of them - yeah, perhaps, that is true - but we wouldn't get all of 
them, would we?  Is there not the danger, then, because this man is clearly 
dangerous - 
 
ASHDOWN:                               Sure. 
 
HUMPHRYS:                              - possibly paranoid; God knows what he 
is - that we will be exposing ourselves to even greater risk. That is, at 
least, a possibility, isn't it? 
 
HUMPHRYS:                              John, there is no action that we can  
take that is without risk.  You have to - I mean let's be absolutely straight 
about this - there is no action we can take that is without risk in these 
circumstances.  You have to balance the risk against another and the risk that 
worries me is the near certainty - and, given his record, I'd be fair to say 
certainty - that if at this stage we do not stop him producing and in due 
course - he must be very close to it - putting these appalling weapons of mass 
destructions onto a delivery system, he will use them.  
 
                                       And, he will use them, initially, for 
instance, on Israel.  Now, the consequence of that is immense.  We've got 
ourselves into a position where in order to stop him doing that, we have to 
take very great risks.  No one doubts that.  But, in terms of the risks that 
would happen if we did not use threats.  And, when I hear all these newspaper 
reports - read all these newspaper reports  - with people arguing about the 
risks, I never hear them saying: What are the risks of not stopping him?  And, 
it seems to me that by any rational calculation, they are immeasurably 
greater.   
 
HUMPHRYS:                              Should we- 
 
ASHDOWN:                               Both for the peace in the Middle East 
and, indeed, for the weight that we can do, in due course, put on International 
Law.    
 
HUMPHRYS:                              Should we not then-sorry, because we're- 
 
ASHDOWN:                               One other point, John.  And, that is, I 
do think that what we talked about, that when we cross this threshold, the idea 
that you can then use military weapons - UN and Weapons Inspectors again - is a 
very serious point.   And, it's why I thought that the initial aim that I heard 
outlined by President Clinton - to a certain extent by our own Prime Minister - 
that we wanted to bomb Saddam Hussein into giving access to these UN, it seemed 
to me an unlikely aim and if we are now moving away from that and recognising 
that it may be, that one of the consequences of taking military action is that 
we will lose the capacity to use the UN to control himfor the long term - for 
the longer term. 
 
HUMPHRYS:                              The other option that you haven't-that 
you haven't touched on here is trying to get rid of Saddam.  Now, I know we've 
talked about it in the past but you say we can attack his Republican Guard.We 
tried to do that after the last war - thought we'd wiped them out - it didn't 
happen then.  
 
ASHDOWN:                               No, we didn't - no. 
 
HUMPHRYS:                              Well, we attacked the Republican Guard.  
We didn't get rid of them.  Now, is there any possibility at all - in your view 
- that if we went for Saddam - and, Heaven knows how we'd do it, we could 
achieve that aim? 
 
ASHDOWN:                               No.  I mean unless we have a military - 
unless we have an Intelligent asset close to him - I mean as part of his 
bodyguard - the answer to that is: no - in my view.  And, it would be a Boy's 
Own military aim but not a realistic one.  And, incidentally, let me just 
correct you.  You're wrong in saying that we failed to attack the-remove the 
Republican Guard.  It was quite - it was a quite specific aim of the end of the 
Gulf War that we did not destroy Saddam Hussein's military capacity for the 
very reason that we did not wish, at that stage, to create a vacuum into  
which, for instance, Syria and Iran could have moved.  And, indeed, we were 
specifically limited - and, in my view, wisely so - at the end of the Gulf 
War.  As for instance, General De La Billiere will say, that they were told not 
to go too far because they wanted to preserve some kind of asset. Now, we may 
have to go through that argument again. 
 
HUMPHRYS:                              What if we do not get the support of the 
United Nations in doing the sorts of things that you've outlined this morning.  
We may not, should we go ahead anyway? 
 
ASHDOWN:                               Well, we may not.  I mean, I however, do 
not lose hope about - provided we lay out a series of rational, diplomatic 
steps with the full force of the international community behind it.  Provided 
we attach to those not only carrots, not only sticks but carrots that there 
ought to be rewards if, for instance, the steps are taken.  For instance,on the 
food for-on the oil for food programme, which the UN has proposed.   I do not 
believe it's impossible for us to assemble - at least, international support if 
not full UN Security Council.  
 
HUMPHRYS:                              But, if we don't get it.  It's possible 
we won't get it.  
 
ASHDOWN:                               Well, look, we've had to do this before. 
It is clear to me that in terms of the existing International Law, the 
determinant is the UN Resolutions.  Those UN Resolutions allows the use of 
force, if they are broken and we can go ahead under those Resolutions perfectly 
legitimately to take the action that is necessary.  
 
HUMPHRYS:                              Even if the Security Council made it 
clear that at this stage they did not approve? 
 
ASHDOWN:                               Well, let's wait and see.  I don't think 
that's a likely consequence.  I think, what you're seeing is the natural 
nervousness at the beginning of a process which is about building up diplomatic 
pressure.  But, my view is very clear: the UN Resolutions allow the use of 
force if the terms of those Resolutions have been broken and they, 
unquestionably, have.  And, if we now put together what I call the diplomatic 
campaign, and we accept that war is a use of diplomacy by other means, then, we 
should be going through this set of steps towards that end.  But, unless you 
hold out the prospect that failure on the diplomatic front can mean the use of 
force, then, that diplomacy is worthless and will not work and I hope we start 
progressing down that track as I believe we are doing rather effectively, just 
at the moment.  
 
HUMPHRYS:                              Paddy Ashdown, many thanks for joining 
us.  
                               ...oooOooo...