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ON THE RECORD
SIR LEON BRITTAN INTERVIEW
RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION: BBC-1 DATE: 06.12.92
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JONATHAN DIMBLEBY: Sir Leon Brittan, it's not going to be
easy is it for the Prime Minister to pull his Presidential chestnuts out of the
fire at Edinburgh?
SIR LEON BRITTAN: Not easy but not impossible, you
probably remember that at about this distance before the Maastricht Council
itself we were going through the same period of it looking jolly difficult and
in fact it proved possible, but it's not a guarantee that it will be.
DIMBLEBY: Let's take some of the key elements in
what he's described as the Rubik Cube, the Government has said on the budget
"we will not move on the question of the British rebate" can Britain hold that
line?
BRITTAN: Yes I think Britain can hold that line.
If Britain is prepared to move, not too much but just a bit on the actual
budget people will understand that Britain can't move on the rebate, there'll
be a great argy bargy about it but I think it can end up that way.
DIMBLEBY: But he's got to be able to move on the
size of the budget itself, moving towards the Commission's figure or Delors'
figure rather than holding it at near freeze.
BRITTAN: Well Britain hasn't proposed to hold it
at near freeze, Britain has already proposed an increase in the budget, the
Commission came up with a larger figure, Delors brought it down and somewhere
in between you've got to reach a figure that everyone could accept.
Remembering always of course that there's no increase proposed by the
Commission for the first two years, so somewhere or other you've got to accept
a figure which is acceptable all round and Britain's not alone in not wanting
to increase it a great deal, but on the other hand you can't expect to spend on
Eastern Europe and things of that kind without providing the extra money.
DIMBLEBY: But if the rebate is to be protected and
held at its present level, if he isn't..if he's going to get that from the
others, are there other concessions that he's got to offer as well as on the
budget or is that going to be enough within that framework?
BRITTAN: No, I think on the budgetry issue what
the makings of a deal would be to keep the rebate as it is but that will take a
lot of fighting for, but then for Britain to increase the present figure that
it's prepared to go to by a small amount and reach a deal on that basis.
DIMBLEBY: Will it help Britain's position if
openly John Major says "well you don't have to have the European Bank in
London, we give up our claim on it".
BRITTAN: Well it's part of a package deal. There
are a lot of European institutions that have to be found homes and not just the
Bank and you could please a lot of people by doing a package deal which would
include the Bank. The Spaniards are very keen that the environmental agency
should go to Seville, the French are extremely anxious about the Parliament and
the reassurance that that would continue to be in Strasbourg for its
preliminary sessions, twelve times a year and that frankly as far as the Bank
is concerned it's jolly difficult to argue for the Bank being in London if
Britain hasn't decided to join EMU stage three, so if you could do a deal which
accepted that the Bank went to Germany but not to Frankfurt, to Bonn, then I
think you would win a lot of browny points all round and that would help I
think in securing Britain's objectives in all other respects.
DIMBLEBY: Do you expect Britain to deliver that?
BRITTAN: Well that you must ask British ministers
about but I think if that was possible it would be a big contribution to the
success of the summit.
DIMBLEBY: On the question of the recovery
programme about which there has been much fierce debate, do you think Britain
is going to have to compromise the position of the moment which is essentially
we're not very keen on any recovery package?
BRITTAN: Well you say that but actually what is
coming forward from the Commission is something that's very much in line with
Britain's Autumn Statement. The idea of concerting national economies to focus
on capital expenditure rather than current expenditure, to give priority to
those capital projects and to cut down on public sector pay, that's a concept
which can be applied Europe wide and the facility that the Commission has
suggested, a five billion loan which will be negotiated because the Community's
able to do so at very favourable rates and then those countries that want
it for the..use for the capital projects will be able to draw on it but will
not have any obligation to do so and won't have to spend a penny unless they
choose to borrow from that loan. All of that fits in very much with the
British conception while at the same time enabling a boost for capital
expenditure across Europe through those trans-European links which could
include of course the rail link to the Channel. I think that there's no
disagreement of philosophy whether Britain accepts this or not, we shall see,
but I think that there is no conflict there at all.
DIMBLEBY: Just on that last point, you're saying
that that.. some of that money could go towards financing the rail link to the
Channel so that a little bit comes back to Britain as it were.
BRITTAN: Oh and of course links with Northern
Ireland and the Republic and all of that, Britain.. this is something which
Britain could certainly gain from.
DIMBLEBY: On the question of our old friend or new
friend subsidiarity, there is huge capital invested in domestic British
politics in toughening up and clarifying the notion of subsidiarity, now the
Government has come up with a list of potential areas where powers should
return to Britain either legislation that's already in place should be.. should
revert or proposed legislation, it's quite a list - is he going to get it?
BRITTAN: Well it's not a question of returning
powers to Britain it's a case of the Community deciding what should..needs to
be done at Community level and what can be left to the member states. Now a
great deal of progress has been made on this, as far as the principles and the
practice are to be applied and already you are actually seeing the Commission
coming up with far fewer proposals and ditching quite a few that have been in
the pipeline.
Now the Commission itself I hope is
going to come up with a list, quite an impressive list I hope, of proposals
which it's not going to go on with or existing law which it's going to amend,
precisely because it considers it isn't necessary to do that at Community
level. I think that that list and you have to match it with with the British
Presidency proposals you'll be able to get something quite impressive out of
that from Edinburgh if all goes well.
DIMBLEBY: Are the Europeans as determined to yield
as it were from the centre to the regions in this matter as Britain has to be
in order to get those Conservative back-benchers on side or is it a much cooler
issue for the rest of Europe?
BRITTAN: If you talk about it in terms of
yielding, a lot of people won't like that and they'll be right not to because
it isn't like that. The principle works both ways, the principle of
subsidiarity is not just about not doing what isn't necessary it's also about
doing what is necessary. If you put it that way and say it's a sensible,
practical principle of saying let's do together what we can better do together
and what doesn't need to be done together because there's no added value in it
and it can be left to the member states then I think you'll get agreement.
DIMBLEBY: I put it that way because as you know
that's the way the British have a powerful tendency of putting it in the
debate.
BRITTAN: Well of course that's natural that you
should do so but I'm putting it in the way that's most likely to reach an
agreement at Edinburgh.
DIMBLEBY: Let's go to the perhaps overwhelming
issue or the top of the agenda, the question of the Danish referendum, it is
critical for the credibility of the British Presidency to deliver something
that the rest of Europe and the Danes think will create momentum for
Maastricht, it looks pretty unlikely at the moment does it not?
BRITTAN: No it doesn't look pretty unlikely, it
looks difficult but I wouldn't go so far as to say unlikely. The truth of the
matter is that hardly any of the things that the Danes actually want really
cause problems for her partners, it's the way it's put and the legality of it,
the.. in fact I think there's a wide degree of concensus, it's the form in
which it's put that has to be hammered out and such matters as its legality,
its duration and so on.
DIMBLEBY: Well let's look at both those things.
On the question of substance rather than form, we have the Christian Democrats
crying foul already, we have Chancellor Kohl saying you can't have Europe a la
carte, on the other hand we have the Danes openly now in disarray about the
character and quality of what Major is proposing.
BRITTAN: Well disarray is wonderfully colourful
but what you mean is disagreement and that doesn't, that's not infrequent and
what..and this is a negotiation and some of the Danish parties are saying that
what Britain has proposed doesn't go far enough and some of Britain's partners
are at this stage saying that it goes too far...
DIMBLEBY: But when for instance..
BRITTAN: ....substance and see whether there is a
possible agreement.
DIMBLEBY: Well then how do you rate what the
speaking for the Christian Democrats, the former Prime Minister of Belgium
Martins (phon) when he says a declaration by the, or a decision, by which
Denmark and I'm quoting him now "will never join the final phase of monetary
union" which is of course what the Danes are insisting on "will never be a
member of the political union, is not acceptable to us".
BRITTAN: Well you see the word "never" is the key
to that and, of course, the way out of that is very simple, the Maastricht
Treaty itself is due to be revised at a new intergovernmental conference in
1996 and I think that you deal with that problem by saing that the commitments
and undertakings that are made lasts as long as the Maastricht Treaty itself
lasts. That avoids the use of the word "never" while at the same time giving
the Danes the assurance that they are not committed to anything further because
of course, any new treaty would also have to be agreed by unanimity. There are
ways through these things if you want to find them.
DIMBLEBY: And you're always adept at seeking to
find those ways Sir Leon, which is why it's interest to hear you say that. Now
let's go to the second area that you touched on, form or if you like also the
question of the standing of any declaration that is made, the Danes say they
won't accept a simple declaration tacked onto the Treaty, they want whatever is
tacked on, whatever declaration there is, to have the same force in law as the
Treaty itself. But the others can't concede that can they?
BRITTAN: Well it's not quite the same force as
the Treaty itself, they want it to be legally binding. Now what the other
states don't want, and very understandably, is to renegotiate the Treaty and to
have to ratify it because most countries will have ratified it by the end of
the year, all ten probably, apart bar Britain and Denmark.
DIMBLEBY: Well how can you have it legally binding
if it, if the Treaty isn't ratified?
BRITTAN: I will just come to that - because what
you can have is an agreement which is not part of the Treaty and not a new
Treaty that is nonetheless an international agreement, possibly one that even
can be registered as such in the way that international law provides, but is
separate from the Maastricht Treaty. That's one way of doing it. Others say
that you don't even have to go as far as that, that an actual decision of the
heads of government granted the special role given to the heads of government
by the Maastricht Treaty, is itself legally binding. So there are ways through
that one as well if you have the common will to achieve it.
DIMBLEBY: Now if that common will is not there or
if it can't be achieved, obviously Maastricht is self evidently in terrible
trouble.
BRITTAN: Yes, but the most important point that
you don't allow for is that there is a huge common desire to find a way forward
because everybody knows that the Community has been a bit in the doldrums in
the few weeks and months, and the desire to get it moving is one that is
shared. Therefore, so long as the particular concerns, whether it's for money,
whether it's for legality as far as the Danes are concerned, whether it's to
have the right balance in subsidiarity, so long as all that can be met there is
a common desire to relaunch the European Community. Don't forget on the first
of January we actually have the single market coming into effect.
DIMBLEBY: Okay Sir Leon, will, given that, John
Major come under great pressure at Edinburgh to say when Britain will ratify?
BRITTAN: Well he's already said pretty clearly
what's going to happen, he has said that he anticiaptes that the Third Reading
in the House of Commons will be in the late Spring and that the ratification
procedure will be completed in the next parliamentary session.
DIMBLEBY: Forgive me Sir Leon, forgive me Sir Leon
as I am sure that you know there is much greater ambiguity than that. He seems
to have said on the one hand that it will be after the Danish referendum and on
the other hand it'll be done by the Summer. If that ambiguity persists which I
think is widely recognised in this country to be there, is that going to
irritate even more profoundly the European Parliament?
BRITTAN: That's not the ambiguity, the ambiguity
is whether British Third Reading in the House of Commons is CONDITIONAL upon a
Danish referendum being at that time or not, that's where the ambiguity lies.
Now..
DIMBLEBY: Well has that got to be resolved?
BRITTAN: If in fact you reach an agreement under
which the Danes are satisfied and say that they are going to hold the
referendum in the Spring then the problem doesn't arise because the condition
is met and that is the best way forward.
DIMBLEBY: Now it's always lovely to have everyone
smiling and putting arms around each other, the fact of the matter is it could
arise and I want to know what you think if it does arise, that the Danes aren't
able to say or don't say "we will have the referendum in the Spring, we're
going to have it later" - will John Major, if he wants to get an awful lot of
other things from the Europeans, have to say "nonetheless we will ratify BEFORE
the Summer recess".
BRITTAN: Well it's not a question of ratifying
before the Summer recess because of course the thing has got to go to the House
of Lords and everything else.
DIMBLEBY: Third Reading.
BRITTAN: Third Reading, yes. I think that if the
Danes were to delay the referendum until the Autumn that would lead to a lot of
criticism of the Danes and I think that they will wish to avoid that at all
cost. I think that the focus would be at least as much on the Danes as on
Britain, obviously people would be wanting Britain to ratify in any event, as
early as possible, on the timetable that has been foreshadowed, but you still
couldn't have implementation of the Treaty because the Danes would be holding
it up until the Autumn so that is why, that is why the whole focus will be on
avoiding that and reaching an agreement so that the Danes have their referendum
in the Spring.
DIMBLEBY: Let me put it another way round - would
it greatly help relations between the partners if John Major were able to say
"we will ratify in the Spring, we hope that will be after the Danish referendum
(sorry Third Reading), we hope that'll be after the Danish referendum has been
held but if not we will still go ahead and do it" - would that help
him?
BRITTAN: Well it depends what else happens in
Edinburgh, it may not be necessary but I..it's difficult to see circumstances
in which that particular line arises because either the Danes have agreed to
have their referendum in the Spring, in which case that's not necessary, or,
the Danes insist that they hold it later on in the Autumn, in which case
British ratification early doesn't help the general implementation.
DIMBLEBY: Sir Leon, quite a lot a stake.
BRITTAN: There is, of course, as always. But I
think that I have been able to show that there are ways forward on all the
fronts that you've mentioned. It doesn't necessarily mean that they will be
achieved, but it can be done.
DIMBLEBY: Sir Leon Brittan, as ever, thank you.
BRITTAN: Thank you.
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