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ON THE RECORD
LORD OWEN INTERVIEW
RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION BBC-1 DATE: 2.5.93
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JONATHAN DIMBLEBY: And now, in Athens, the man who was at
the centre and has been at the centre of the negotiations which have brought
about this potential end of the war in Bosnia.
***********
But let's go first straight to Athens
where the press conference came to an end a short time ago, after the talks had
finished. Here now are some of the key points which emerged from it.
LORD OWEN: Firstly this is a happy day, a day in
the Balkans, a day in Athens, the sunshine and let's hope that this does mark
the moment of an irreversible peace process for Bosnia Herzegovina, so we have
the twelve signatures that makes the peace plan.
Dr. Karadzic has of course made his
signature, which is a commitment, but it would be overtaken if there was
to be an adverse decision by his Republic of Serbska(phon) Assembly, but he
has signed the document, he's committed his delegation, and for that decision,
a brave and courageous decision, I thank him, as I thank all the parties that
have contributed to the compromises and to the painful decisions to allow a
comprehensive peace settlement to be established.
We are determined to set in motion a
process of healing but also a process in which the odious practice of ethnic
cleansing is reversed, we are determined to establish a atmosphere where once
again Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, live together,
inter-marry, share the same apartments and generally live as they did before
this tragic war. And I think this is a time at the moment to set aside talk of
military options. I don't deny that perhaps it has helped concentrate people's
minds, given the gravity of the situation over the last few months, in Bosnia
Herzegovina, that people have looked to all forms of pressure, but now I think
it is time to talk of peace and not of war.
DIMBLEBY: Lord Owen, I watched you - and people
watching this programme watched you - at the Press Conference. You were
looking quietly confident, relaxed, a rather happy man. Is that a fair
assessment?
LORD OWEN: Yes, it is. I mean, I think you can
hardly labour like we've done for the last eight months and not be mighty
pleased that you've now got within a very close distance now of a comprehensive
peace settlement. I do think that there will not be trouble on Wednesday when
this is put to the Serbian Assembly, but even if there was, I think the
commitment of the Yugoslav Government now to the peace settlement is total and
they will deliver it, even if there were to be problems with the Assembly, but
I don't expect that.
DIMBLEBY: Milosovic has been absolutely crucial to
this.
OWEN: Yes, absolutely, and that's the person
who I think I've always believed would ultimately deliver a settlement. It had
to be a fellow Serb who, to persuade the Bosnian Serbs, that this was a fair
compromise and that they should sign up for it.
DIMBLEBY: Why do you think that he changed his
ground? For eight months, as you say, you've been trying to persuade the Serbs
to "see sense". Why has he taken so long to deliver and what turned him?
OWEN: Well, for quite some many months we
couldn't get the Bosnian Government, the Muslims, to accept the agreement
either. We got the Croats on board relatively easily, but even that took us
some time, but over the last month since we've had the Bosnian Government, it's
been possible to concentrate predominantly I suppose on the Serbs. I think
that all these pressures that have mounted have been extremely important, and
when I negotiated with Milosovic, what I think was the crucial point really,
Sunday afternoon in Belgrade, he wanted to avoid having the next tranche of
economic sanctions and I think he, as a former banker, he knew perfectly well
these were going to hurt and we tried very hard to get the settlement agreed
then and there, and his last words were to me, you know, what about trying to
meet in Athens, and I said we'll deliver certain things and I - real actions -
and we will agree to a meeting in Athens. He delivered those actions.
DIMBLEBY: What were those actions in essence?
OWEN: The first one was to get the Referendum
idea, which was stupid, off the agenda, and superseded by another meeting of
the Bosnian Serb Assembly. The second was to get the endorsement of his stance
as, from his own Parliament, and that meant challenging Schechil(phon),
who was taking a very rampant "support the Bosnian Serbs and Republic of....
DIMBLEBY: ...this is his sort of number two, who
is regarded as the most Fascistic of all..
OWEN: Yes. He's the most nationalistic. He's
the man who has risen on the tide of nationalism which Milosevic himself
inspired, but you know the old saying "he climbs on the tiger has difficulty in
getting off", but I think Milosevic last Sunday convinced me that he wanted to
get a settlement. And then we also have the Montenegrin Parliament too coming
in. It is a Federal Republic, and President Bulatovic also strongly supported
the plan - to have effectively Yugoslavia united, that the Bosnian Serbs
couldn't continue.
DIMBLEBY: Now, given that he is a pretty tough
cookie, did he make it very clear to Karadzic that the war - in your judgement
- that this war would not be permitted to be prosecuted any longer?
OWEN: I think there was no doubt in the
meetings that went on through the night and early this morning, in which Prime
Minister Mitsotakis also played an important part - because the Greeks are
traditional friends of the Serbs - that this couldn't go on and I think that
was the final thing when they realised - the Bosnian Serbs - that they simply
would not be sustained across the frontiers of Serbia and Montenegro.
DIMBLEBY: Now in this studio, in this programme, a
representative of the Bosnian Government - although he's pleased that there's
been some movement - does not believe for a moment that it will stick and he
wants to get the UN troops in there very quickly indeed to police, as from now.
OWEN: Well, he's speaking the same language as
myself and Mr. Vance and his own President, President Izetbegovic. We would
all like to see implementation as soon as is humanly possible and we will
certainly look at having monitors on the ceasefire line. It's now possible to
do that because you're not fixing the status quo. But the plan is very clear -
the pull-back once the cessation of hostilities starts, and the clock starts
ticking, the forces have to withdraw to their Provinces where they're going to
have a majority - in the Serbian case its three Provinces - and that process
of withdrawal has to take place within forty-five days. So the crucial
question now for the United States is "are they going to contribute UN
peace-keeping forces for Europe; are we going to put serious forces in as UN
peace-keepers; and are we going to get them in there fast"?
DIMBLEBY: Sorry to interrupt you. Can't see you
down there - you can't see me. Are you saying that what John Major ought to be
doing this evening is saying to President Clinton "We will put troops in there
swiftly, but you've got to put troops in on the ground as well. Will you
deliver on that?
OWEN: I'm sure that's what he will be saying.
John Major and Douglas Hurd have been thoroughly supportive of Mr. Vance and I
throughout - indeed, so has the whole of the European Community. I don't think
we can expect the United States to even put the majority. I would hope that
the majority came from Europe - West and East, and I hope there will be a
contribution from the Russian Federation.
DIMBLEBY: How many troops do you believe are
needed to police the ceasefire if it holds?
OWEN: I'm not an expert and I defer to
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from NATO. I think he'll make the ultimate
decision. The figure I often hear is fifty-thousand on the ground in
Bosnia-Herzegovina - that's also its logistic tail there, but there's a
logistic tail outside the country which will add another fifteen to twenty
thousand, so it's fifty thousand forces there is what most people seem to be
talking about, but that's... a lot depends on the climate, the atmosphere, the
extent to which we get the trust and confidence of all the parties, the extent
to which the West shows some generosity now in slowly and progressively
withdrawing the economic sanctions. Don't withdraw them just on trust, but
withdraw them a little more generously than sometimes we do on sanctions, and
show a measure of trust. You can always put them back on if you can't... if
it's not matched by the other side.
DIMBLEBY: That's an interesting point, but that
will... can only begin when the UN is convinced that this ceasefire is turning
into a peace settlement. How long in your judgement do we give that? There's
bound to be sporadic fighting still for the next day or two, or more. When do
we say "This is it; one way or the other"?
OWEN: It's a very complex plan and I only
heard a little bit of your programme, but it's more detailed and more
thought out actually than appeared, and all these time-tables have been
carefully laid down and NATO's had time to study them. The time-table for
withdrawal of heavy weapons, the time-table for demilitarisation of Sarajevo,
and the return to the Provinces, and one thing we've been discussing of course
very much over the last fortnight - how to get really effective forces into the
northern corridor and there it would greatly help if we have forces from North
America, from good, capable Western European Governments, and also from the
Russian Federation. We're all in this together. I believe the countries that
have been involved in this peace conference - thirty-two of them - will help us
now on implementation.
Most people have looked over the
precipice at all the other options, military options, and they're all extremely
unattractive and I think, therefore, there will be a really pretty strong
commitment to making this peace settlement work. It will not be easy.
Nobody's pretended otherwise, but it's a
comprhensive settlement for stitching a country together that's been torn apart
and ravaged by war, and there's more than just the military side - there's the
human rights monitors, there's the human rights commissioners, there's the
Ombudsmen, there's the whole need to try and reverse ethnic cleansing and to
start the whole process, it's a much more fundamental process of
reconciliation.
DIMBLEBY: Now, if you are right and this process
begins to happen, you want to hear much less (if I picked up what you said in
the press conference correctly) you want to hear much less about any of the
military options that are being canvassed. In this studio, Paddy Ashdown and
Jack Cunningham of the Labour Party, were saying - and it's clear so far as one
can detect it - that the Americans and the British Government are not backing
off discussing the military option. Why do you think that that ought to be put
on hold or on stand-by?
OWWEN: Well, I don't think it's sensible not to
discuss it and I think, you know, every.. proper caution is necessary if you've
lived with as many different lies told to you as I have over the lat eight
months. You're not going to take things just on paper, but I think you've also
got to be positive and I think that the bombing option was always fraught with
problems, fraught with difficulty. Any military intervention - even the
no-fly zone had its problems and is now up and running. But I think that the
key question is to talk about implementation and I'm sure that's what will have
to happen in Warren Christopher's turn round Europe this time, and also when he
goes to Moscow, because that's what the UN and the world expects now. They
want this peace plan to be made to stick and they don't, I think, want to hear
much talk about bombing. That may be something which we have to face up to
but, frankly, it's changed.
DIMBLEBY: May be something that we'll have to face
up to? Do you say?
OWEN: It may be, but I don't believe so.
Look, come off it now - you've all had your time on bombing, now let's talk
about peace and how you implement a peace plan. It's a complex thing to do but
that's the SERIOUS question from SERIOUS people, and let the bombing and the
bombers have... they've had their day now - let's get into the serious question
of implementation.
DIMBLEBY: Lord Owen, that's a very interesting
thing you're saying. As a negotiator and a peace negotiator who desperately
hopes that it's going to work and believes it will work, of course you will say
that. I'm only putting to you what it appears that others are still talking
about. You're saying to them "Lay off it".
OWEN: Well, they're behind the curve. They're
behind the curve. The issue is now how to implement this peace plan. Well,
we're bound to have our reservation. Obviously you're going to have a
reservation until you can be clear that the Bosnian/Serb Assembly has signed up
or, if they haven't done, the Yugoslavs have delivered, but let's be positive.
That's not a bad thing to do in this present fraught time, and we need to have
a little more optimism. We've got the signatures on a comprehensive peace plan
- that's the crucial thing.
DIMBLEBY: Lord Owen, a lot of people will be
hoping that your faith and your hard work will turn out as you want it to turn
out.
Thank you very much for talking to us.
...oooOooo....
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ON THE RECORD
LORD OWEN INTERVIEW
RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION BBC-1 DATE: 2.5.93
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JONATHAN DIMBLEBY: Lord Owen, on this second day of the
talks how do you judge the prospects?
LORD OWEN: Well I think most of the discussions, as
is often the case in these sort of conferences, has gone on through the night
and in the margin. Certainly, the three Presidents from Yugoslavia, led by Mr
Milosevic have met through the night with Dr Karadzic and I hope that that
persuasion will be decisive.
DIMBLEBY: From the first three hours of so of
talks that you had yesterday, is it clear to you that the Bosnian Serbs are
being required to take this very seriously?
OWEN: Oh, there's no doubt about that. I mean
the formidable pressure that's coming on them is from the Belgrade Serbs and
that's the one that they listen to, that's the one that effects them because
the war machine inside Bosnia Herzegovina is fuelled from Yugoslavia, it's
across the Serbian and Montenegrin border and that's why of course the world
has put sanctions on Belgrade. We've rightly had no truck with this argument
that they have no influence, they have a great deal of influence.
DIMBLEBY: Is it your view that Milosevic is saying
in effect: you have got to accept the Vance/Owen plan with maybe modification
on corridors, otherwise you get nothing more from us, is he being as tough as
that?
OWEN: I think so. I, as you know, spent many
hours with him...last week and in all the meetings that I had with him in
Belgrade, but particularly last Sunday I came to the veiw that he had decided
that this war had to end and he has the power to end it. Now, the problem is
that the Serbian people and the Serbian unity across the nation is very strong
whether you live in Serbia or Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Croatia or Macedonia and
they are very loath to ever be seen to be split in public.
This division of opinion, now very open
after the three Presidents' letters is crucial. The last time we had this split
of opinion in Geneva, when Mr Vance and I negotiated with all of them, late
into the night, in a hotel in Geneva, allowed the pressure to build up so that
Dr Karadzic signed two of the documents, the constitutional principles and the
one dealing with the defence, the military arrangements. Hopefully now we'll
get those other two documents on track and signed in the next few days.
DIMBLEBY: Now, it involves the Bosnian Serbs
giving up something like thirty per cent of that land which they've occupied by
force, Milosevic is one hundred per cent behind that and insisting on that as
well?
OWEN: The withdrawal to the provinces which is
a crucial part of the plan, yes, I think he accepts that.
DIMBLEBY: Now, if the deal is to work, am I right
that a signature on a piece of paper in Belgrade is not enough. The Bosnian
Serb leader Karadzic has got to go back to what is called the Bosnian Serb
parliament and get them to agree it, otherwise it doesn't mean anything?
OWEN: We don't yet know whether he..what is
the status of where he'll sign, or whether it's ad-referendum or whether he
goes back, that's a matter to some extent up to him. But, the crucial thing is
the signature and the world's not going to delay, afterall the sanctions are
in. I mean when I was negotiating with them in Belgrade of course, the clock
was ticking and they were trying to avoid sanctions, the new sanctions even
starting.
Now, they know the sanctions are there,
they are also feeling those sanctions, they're getting those sanctions really
quite strongly at them and I think the financial seizure of financial assets is
something which has been quite powerful because Milosevic was a banker and he
understands now what's building up. So all these different pressures have
certainly changed the minds of politicians and remember Milosevic actually won
support for his stand in the Serbian parliament and President Bulatovic of
Montenegro won very strong support from his parliament so this is no longer
just the Presidents talking they've got the support of their political friends
and collegues....Mr Schechil (phon) is isolated now.
DIMBLEBY: Lord Owen, you're sounding very
optimistic that there will be a deal. When do you expect a settlement, how
long can this run before you have a signature which can be waved in the air as
a real deal?
OWEN: I'm not keen on waving pieces of paper
in the air but I personally think that it's right to be cautiously optimistic
and as I say we'd like to get a signature as soon as possible. I'm not going
to pin myself down on the days but they all know that it certainly would have
to come no later than when they meet on Wednesday.
DIMBLEBY: So Wednesday is the deadline in effect,
before further action is likely to be on the cards, namely military action.
OWEN: No, no, we're not tied in that sort of
time scale. The consultations are going on as you know between the crucial
countries but if, as the results of these dicussions there was no agreement, no
signature the pressure would then come on even firmer, even more toughly from
Milosevic. I mean I would expect to see the actual supply lines effectively
cut by the Yugoslavs and that's what we're demanding. But, the issue will then
come to the Security Council. I would be surprised if there was any form of
rejection by Dr Karadzic if it didn't come pretty quickly to the Security
Council.
DIMBLEBY: Lord Owen as you know, the Americans are
very sceptical about the Bosnian Serbs delivering on the basis of past evidence
with quite a lot of justification. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, is
in Britain to see the Prime Minister. How helpful to driving the Bosnian Serbs
to sign is this American pressure for military action?
OWEN: I don't think it has as much influence
as you might think. It's extraordinary but the Bosnian Serbs are very isolated
they...this is a sort of village peasant war to a great extent. As long as
they go on getting their supplies from Belgrade, I don't think they really care
very much or know very much about what is happening in the outside world. This
is the problem, their so-called assembly is terribly insulated from any of
these pressures.
DIMBLEBY: Would you include in that lack of alarm
about the military prospects, Milosevic and Serbia in general, or is his he
very well aware of what this means?
OWEN: He's very well aware of it, they are
very very aware, it's a complete difference between Belgrade which is a sort of
sophisticated cosmopolitan European city which the politicians are aware of
European and international pressures and the situation on the ground in rural
Bosnia Herzegovina in the areas controlled by the Serbians. They've built
themselves up into a very isolated community, they think they can take on the
world. It's a sort of traditional Serbian defiance, you know, and if you go to
Pale, the mood is... it's a very unrealistic world and it's one of the
political problems we're having to deal with.
DIMBLEBY: But in the sophisticated world of
Belgrade, does it matter from the point of view of the credibility of this
additional lever of military action, which, of course, would have enormous
consequences within the international community. Is that in in... effected or
undermined by the clear division of view between the Europeans and the British
on the one hand, and the Americans on the other about how far to go and how
fast to go?
OWEN: I don't think it matters tremendously.
I think the economic pressures have been important, the political pressures. I
think the fact that the military pressures are there is not unhelpful, I'm not
against it but I think that fortunately it's not been overdone. I think if it
was sounding very much as if this meeting was under a ultimatum I think that
would actually probably have not worked. But the fact that President Clinton
is saying he's not going to make a final decision until he's heard from the
consultations with Warren Christopher, is about the right balance you know.
DIMBLEBY: Is... sorry, Lord Owen, is this the last
chance against that background, in your view, for talks before military action
should happen?
OWEN: I don't think you can tell. My own view
is very clear that the really crucial pressure comes from Milosevic and if he
decided to cut supplies off that's a lot better than doing it by bombs. Apart
from anything else it would be very much more effective.
DIMBLEBY: Dr Owen, do you expect indication, clear
indication today finally, that there will be a Bosnian Serb signature?
OWEN: I would be surprised if we don't get a
even further commitment, even tougher commitment from Milosevic in particular
to deliver a settlement out of today's discussions. Hopefully even more
positive and more specific than that.
...oooOooo...
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