Interview with Lord Owen




       
       
       
 
 
 
 
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                                 ON THE RECORD            
 
 
RECORDED FROM TRANSMISSION BBC-1                                   DATE 20.6.93
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JONATHAN DIMBLEBY:                     Good afternoon and welcome to On The 
Record. In a few hours time the European Foreign Ministers will meet to decide 
what - if anything - to do about the carve-up of Bosnia proposed by the  
Serbo-Croat Alliance.  Lord Owen will address that meeting and I'll be asking 
him what he thinks  should now be done.   
 
                                                                               
                                       And now for an explanation. You might 
have expected to see the Chancellor of the Exchequer with me here today. 
Unfortunately however Kenneth Clarke withdrew from the programme. I'm sorry 
about that. Another time I trust.                                 
 
                                       And now to Bosnia, and to the man who 
has spent long months trying to broker a settlement between the warring 
parties. The Vance-Owen plan of which he was co-author is now to all intents 
and purposes dead. So what can the European Community's Special Envoy do now - 
if anything.                    
                                                                        
                                       Lord Owen, it is reported that the 
Foreign Minister's meeting this afternoon could be about to say diplomatically, 
well we wash our hands of Bosnia.  Is that likely?  Would it be wise? 
 
LORD OWEN:                             I don't think they will do that.  
They've stuck with it through very difficult times and I think they will stay 
with it because I think there is still quite a lot to shape and to mould of 
this agreement, and I think we may even be surprised by how much of the 
Vance/Owen plan comes up in it.  But a lot depends, really, on how badly they 
want to have sanctions lifted.  I think that President Milosevic wants 
sanctions lifted very badly and, therefore, I think he will listen to people 
like myself and Mr Stoltenberg, the UN envoy, when we explain that if they 
don't do certain things then the World Community will not accept it.  And above 
all they've got to satisfy the Muslims.  They've got to be generous to the 
Muslims, that's the essential really, I think. 
 
DIMBLEBY:                              Let me then explore a bit of that with 
you.  They will in effect, even if part of Vance/Owen may be in the new 
settlement, they will in effect - as you have already almost acknowledged, they 
will be saying Vance/Owen as it stood is no longer a runner. 
 
LORD OWEN:                             No, what they'll be aiming for is to 
stay ... keep Bosnia Hercegovina, but to call it Federal Republic or a 
Confederal, hopefully a Federal Republic, and there will be three Republics.  
An essentially Serbian Republic, Republic of Serbsco (phon), a Croatian 
Republic, Republic Herce Bosnia (phon) and a Muslim Republic Herce ... Bosnia, 
so that Republic Bosnia which would be Muslim.  And there would be five parts 
because you can't split it just into three.  There's a Bihac province which 
would be linked across Serbian territory with Central Bosnia, which would be 
the Muslim one.  And the Croatians up on the Sava (phon) in the north and down 
on the Dalmatian Coast in the south. 
 
DIMBLEBY:                              But that obviously is very different 
from ten multi-ethnic groupings.  Can I suggest to you that what this does say, 
because this is what is proposed effectively by the Serbs and the Croats in 
Geneva, that what this says is 'might is right'. 
 
LORD OWEN:                             Well, there's too much of that about for 
my liking, and I don't like it, but then I have to live in the world as it is. 
There is, there will be more territory taken by force capped than in the 
roll-back envisaged in the Vance/Owen plan.  But there will still be a fairly 
significant roll-back.  I'm not absolutely certain, the maps have not yet been 
produced.  They have discussed this in general terms, the detail was asked for 
by President Izetbegovic as I think he had every right to do, and that won't be 
available until Wednesday when we meet in Geneva. 
 
DIMBLEBY:                              If the Muslims continue to fight, for 
instance around Mostar, it will be inevitable that the Croats and maybe the 
Serbs as well will move on.  We can't presume that the borders that they have 
proposed - or the five bits of territory that you've spoken of, will remain 
intact, unless the fighting stops now. 
 
LORD OWEN:                             No.  I mean this is the trouble.  
They've torn up the map that ... the ten province map that we produced over the 
last five to six weeks in particular because of the fighting between the 
Muslims and the Croats, and the nature of the civil war has become very much 
more apparent, and you are right they are now fighting for instance over 
Mostar.  There's a very strong case for any Muslim Republic going down to 
Mostar, it takes them closer to the sea and there would then have to be some 
international guaranteed access to the Port of Plochy (phon) which is on the 
Dalmatian Coast but is actually in Croatia.  And similarly I think it's very 
important that they get access up in the north onto the River Sava (phon) which 
links up to the Danube and is navigable and the barge traffic is a very 
important part of the Tuzla economy. 
 
DIMBLEBY:                              Does that mean that you hope that the 
European Ministers will be, as it were, encouraging the Muslims in that 
respect.  Not urging them to fight but saying look, we're with you in giving 
you these two key outlets? 
 
LORD OWEN:                             Yes.  I think we ... I don't know how 
much will be dealt with publicly and how much will be dealt with privately, but 
it would certainly help me as a negotiator if I know what are the sort of 
bottom line of the European Community and can say with authority to the Serbs 
and the Croats 'If you don't do this then sanctions will not be lifted'.  And, 
indeed, as far as Croatia's concerned, where there are not sanctions, if they 
ignore the views of the European Community with whom they are trying to have 
ever-increasing economic links, then the European Community will take a pretty 
dim view of it, even to the extent maybe of going as far as depriving Croatia 
of some of those economic links.  So we are not totally without power and we 
oughtn't to think so.  But what we are seeing is much more of an ethnic map 
than many of us would have ever liked to have seen, and more territory taken as 
a result of the fighting than we would have liked to have seen.  But then the 
situation on the ground is deteriorating hour by hour, day by day, and that's 
what makes me feel that we've got to hang in there and get a settlement as 
quickly as we can. 
 
DIMBLEBY:                              So just to summarise briefly that last 
very important set of points you were making.  You want from the Europeans a 
commitment, yes? to a five-part ethnic state?  But, yes, guaranteeing Muslim 
rights of access and saying to you unequivocally 'That's what we want.  Go out 
there and fight for it,' and if - if, they continue to resist that we will put 
every single ounce of economic muscle into depriving them of the means of 
warfare? 
 
LORD OWEN:                             Yes, I think we've got to stand by the 
Muslims to give their Republic - of the three Republics, their Republic must be 
viable.  It must not be one that can be just squeezed out of existence, it is 
inevitably going to be surrounded by Croatia and Serbia and Croats and Serbs, 
but it's got to have an, if you like, an independent viability even though it 
is part of Bosnia Hercegovina. 
 
DIMBLEBY:                              But Lord Owen, the problem and the 
reason why I put that point to you is that, hither to, the economic pressures 
have had no impact on the readiness of the Serbs and Croats to fight it to what 
they want. 
 
LORD OWEN:                             Well I don't totally agree.  I think 
the ... after all we got an agreement in Athens and I was on this programme, 
and one of the reasons we got that agreement was President Milosevic wanted 
sanctions lifted and leant very heavily on Dr Karadic.
 
DIMBLEBY:                              But look what happened to the agreement. 
 
LORD OWEN:                             Yes.  Well they turned it down and the 
answer ... the main reason they turned it down was that there was no continuous 
link between the three Serbian provinces.  Now we deliberately deprived them of 
that and they wanted a territorial corridor.  We were offering them a UN 
guaranteed through-way.  That was not sufficient to swing the Bosnian Serbs, 
and they've always wanted much more authority, much more autonomy and so have 
the Croats. 
 
                                       I think the problem is at the moment 
that the Muslims are very reluctant to negotiate and, I mean, this is a 
proposal that has come up from the Croats and the Serbs, it is not the proposal 
which I or Mr Stoltenberg have put before them.  But it is one which they are 
listening and we are beginning to help shape, but in the ultimate analysis it 
is going to be up to the nine member presidency of Bosnia Hercegovina 
Government to determine whether or not they will accept it.  So it's not just 
up to any one or two individuals, they are a collective presidency they've 
abandoned - had to, during the war - their Parliament, so it's that presidency 
that will have to really decide whether or not to go with this or at least to 
open negotiations on it. 
 
DIMBLEBY:                              Notwithstanding your own hopes about the 
efficacy of economic sanctions; notwithstanding your feeling that they might 
wish to settle, a great many people will have the feeling that what has 
happened here is in effect a declaration that ... to warlords everywhere: if 
you want to go and ethnically cleanse by all means try it on.  Do you have some 
sympathy with that horror that people feel? 
 
LORD OWEN:                             Well, I think that it's too close for 
comfort.  I think bad, evil things have been done.  There is of course a War 
Crimes Tribunal that's been established by the UN and I hope some people are 
brought for trial.  I think that we must not forget the horrors that have 
happened in former Yugoslavia.  On the other hand, you can't hold out for the 
ideal when you're not going to get it, when there's a continued war, and when 
the situation on the ground is deteriorating.  So, I mean, nobody is more 
committed to the Vance/Owen plan than I was, but I have to be realistic and I 
have to live with the situation as it is.  Day by day people's houses are being 
burnt and destroyed and shelled, people are losing their lives. 
 
                                       We are also seeing a very serious 
situation as far as the UN forces are concerned.  I mean we've just had a 
person very seriously injured who was sent into Gorazdi one of the UN 
monitors.  We've also had not only loss of life amongst the UNPROFOR forces but 
amongst the humanitarian workers and the drivers of the lorries.  The convoys 
are not getting through they're being stopped all the time.  There's a 
deterioration in electricity supplies, in water supplies and the health 
problems are going to be, by the winter, very severe indeed.  So I feel a sense 
of urgency.  This thing has got to be settled and the war's got to be brought 
to an end before the winter comes. 
 
                                       We got away last year with a tremendous 
humanitarian effort, saved - many people think, four hundred thousand people's 
lives.  It will be much harder next winter. 
 
DIMBLEBY:                              And to the thought, Lord Owen, that by 
happenstance and despite your efforts, you have effectively - having hoped to 
achieve things down the line from the increasing wreckage in Bosnia, that you 
have effectively become the 'fall guy' for a failure of diplomatic and military 
will in Europe and the United States.  What do you think of that? 
 
LORD OWEN:                             I took the job on when the war was 
already six months in, and in fact most of the territorial gains and lands had 
been grabbed.  And I always knew it was a difficult task.  I don't regret 
taking it on and I don't regret fighting through.  I suppose I could have 
walked out a few months back and stuck to the Vance/Owen plan and said, you 
know, on this I take my stand.  It certainly would have been morally purer, but 
I think I just have to put - well like for the forces on the ground at the 
moment, the UN soldiers and the UNHCR workers, they're working on in 
frustrating, difficult circumstances.  As the peace negotiator I think I have 
to, and that's Mr Stoltenberg's view as well. 
 
DIMBLEBY:                              Lord Owen, just in a word.  Would it 
have been easier if you had been able to speak softly and carry a big stick 
rather than have to speak loudly and carry a little one? 
 
LORD OWEN:                             It would have been much easier to have 
had a big stick on many, many occasions in these negotiations.  And 
particularly right at the start, before the real horror fighting took place.  
The shelling of Dubrovnik, the shelling and destruction of Vukovar, these are 
terrible things.  And we must remember there is still the possibility of a war 
between the Croats and the Serbs in Croatia. 
 
DIMBLEBY:                              Lord Owen, many thanks.  
 
 
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