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Devolution: Scotland
The Government intends to hold a referendum in Scotland within six months on
the question of Scottish devolution.
The Scottish Labour Party and Scottish Liberal Democrats participated in the
Scottish Constitution Convention which produced its final report in November
1995. The Convention's proposals for a devolved Scottish Parliament form the basis of both parties' policies. The Parliament would have powers to vary the level of income tax (3p more or less than the standard national rate) and authority to legislate in a number of policy areas including education, criminal justice and health. The primary matters to be retained by the UK Parliament would be defence, foreign affairs, immigration, social security policy and central economic and fiscal responsibilities.
Two Questions
In June 1996 the Labour Party announced that it would not introduce
legislation until the policy had been endorsed in a referendum with two
questions: one asking for endorsement of the Parliament's tax-varying powers.
In the Joint Labour-LibDem Statement of March 1997, the Liberal Democrats indicated that despite their disagreement with Labour's intention to hold a pre-legislative referendum, they "would not seek to frustrate or delay the referendum legislation." Both parties would campaign for a double "yes" vote in the referendum. However, Tony Blair later said that the Labour Party's promise not to raise income tax over the course of this Parliament would also apply to the Scottish Parliament.
The Conservative Party is opposed to devolution on the grounds that "the development of new assemblies in Scotland and Wales would create strains which could well pull apart the Union" and could create rivalry and conflict between these parliaments or assemblies and the parliament at Westminster. It also points to "serious questions" about the level of representation of Scottish and Welsh MPs at Westminster following devolution (the 'West Lothian Question').
However, the Tories' electoral rout north of the border is forcing them to think again about the issue.
The SNP's central policy platform is the creation of an independent Scotland. It did not take part in the Scottish Constitutional Convention. It has argued that any referendum should include a third question offering the option of independence, but Labour has steadfastly resisted this. Recently, the SNP has implied that if no third question was included, it might nevertheless be prepared to campaign for a double yes.
Timing
The Government had promised to introduce substantive legislation in the first year of the new Parliament. The critical question to watch for in the Government's proposals is how quickly the referendum can be held. The manifesto promised it before the autumn.
The major obstacle to an early poll is that referendums need authorising
legislation. It seems fairly certain that for the devolution referendums, the legislation will be concerned solely with the referendum. The option of 'generic' legislation authorising a number of referendums has been discussed by Labour frontbenchers, but given the timing constraints is unlikely to gain support from business managers. The other option would be to authorise the
referendum in substantive legislation, with its implementation dependent on the
outcome of the referendum. But Tony Blair has made clear that he intends the
referendum to be pre-legislative.
Because of the time needed to draft legislation, the rules governing intervals
between different stages in parliamentary procedure (both in the Commons and
the Lords), and the likely opposition to the bill, it seems unlikely that
referendum legislation will reach the statute book before August. Even then,
it would mean the House of Lords sitting into August, an unprecedented move.
The only alternative is to negotiate a 'fast-track' timetable on the back of
the manifesto commitment. Either way, the Government will be using up stocks
of parliamentary goodwill early on. The Conservatives have indicated that
they would resist attempts to take the bill in a standing committee, rather
than on the floor of the House; but Labour has not said that it intends to do
so - indeed, it is unlikely to do so, as any new procedures will arise from the
recommendations of a new select committee, which are unlikely to be in place
before the referendum bill is introduced.
It might be up to nine months after Royal Assent before elections could take
place. The first meeting of the Parliament could be held shortly thereafter,
with a further three months of running-in operations - settling standing
orders, committee structure, dry-running operations with the Scottish Office -
before full powers are transferred.
Referendum Rules
In each previous UK referendum, rules have been drawn up ad hoc. This worked well enough for the Euro-referendum, where two sides emerged organically, and resources (including broadcast time) could be divided equally between them. But it was far less simple with the 1970 devolution referendums, when members of different political parties refused to work together in umbrella "yes" and "no" campaigns. The confusion created was a contributing factor in the negative outcome of the referendum.
Moreover, the outcome of the 1979 vote was controversial because of another rule, adopted against the wish of the Government. There was a majority for
devolution: 51.6% for, and 48.4% against. However, during the Parliamentary
proceedings on the Scotland Act, a clause had been inserted on the initiative
of a Labour backbencher, George Cunningham MP. This provided that, unless 40%
of those entitled to vote voted in favour, the Government had to lay an Order
before Parliament which, if passed, would repeal the Act. With a turnout of
62.9%, the 'Yes' vote was only 32.9% of the electorate. The Labour Government accordingly tabled an Order repealing the Scotland and Wales Acts (Parliament did not vote on an Order repealing the Act until after the change of Government in May 1979). The outcome of the referendum produced lasting resentment; it was felt that the rules had been biased against advocates of a Scottish Assembly.
The Labour manifesto says that a simple majority of those voting in Scotland
will be the requirement, and this is intended to ensure that at least in the
House of Lords (whose members by convention do not seek to amend legislative
provisions foreshadowed in a party manifesto) no attempt is made to reproduce
the threshold clause.
More Complications
This time around, a further complicating factor will be the use of two
questions on the ballot paper. It seems possible that there vill be four
campaigns - one for each permutation of answers. This will create significant
problems in public education, and in the provision of public resources, such as
government-sponsored leaflets. Decisions about allocation will inevitably run
the risk of being seen to be politically motivated.
The independent Commission on the Conduct of Referendums, which reported in
November 1996, recommended that for future referendums there would be advantage
in establishing a clear framework of rules in advance. The most effective way
of achieving his would be to give responsibility for the conduct of referendums
to an independent body. Its functions might
include: advising on the wording of the question(s); ensuring adequate provision
of public information; liaising with and acting as moderator between any
campaign groups; allocating their funds; acting as an ombudsman
to deal with any complaints; monitoring fair access to the media; and giving
guidance on the organisation at each polling station.
Substantive Legislation
The precedent of the Scotland Act 1978 is useful in that it provides a starting
point for the drafters, but its merits were never tested in practice. One key point that emerged in the pre-election debates concerned the style of drafting. This is nor as arcane as it might seem, as the way the legislation is drafted will determine the scope for conflict between Westminster and the devolved body.
The 1978 Act sought to define with great precision the legislative competences
of the devolved Assembly by reference to statutes then in force in Scotland.
Many commentators believe that this was a mistake. No allocation of powers is
without its grey areas - but the Act failed adequately to acknowledge this. As
a result it was impossible to understand without reference to other
legislation, would have been difficult to use in practice, and would have
required frequent amendment.
The Constitution Unit and others have argued that the Act should instead list only the powers retained at Westminster rather than those devolved. Express provision should be made for Westminster to legislate
outside its areas of retained competence in certain circumstances e.g. to
comply with international obligations, or when the Scottish Parliament requests
Westminster legislation; and for the Scottish Parliament likewise to be able to
encroach on Westminster's retained powers when necessary - with their consent.
However tightly the legislation is drawn, disputes about the precise scope of
the Scottish Parliament's competence would arise. They might be resolved, or
avoided, by a number of means:
-
scrutiny of bills in advance of introduction by the Scottish Law Officers and
the Speaker of the Parliament
-
provision for a direct challenge to Scottish Acts on the grounds that they go
beyond the scope of the devolution laws, following Royal Assent but before
entry into force
-
provision for indirect challenges - where devolution points occur in the course
of other cases - to be referred to the final court of appeal for an opinion
-
provision for the direct challenge of executive acts of the Scottish Executive
at any time.
Taxation powers
The proposed power to vary the basic rate of income tax is intended to spread
any tax change widely and visibly. Achieving those aims in practice might
require tighter definition, since both the level of the basic rate and the
income range to which it applies will be determined by Westminster. Most
commentators agree that the proposed variation of three pence in the pound will
have no significant macroeconomic effects for the UK as a whole. The financial
arrangements proposed by the SCC are a sensible basis on which to establish the
Parliament, but do not promise stability in the longer term. The Barnett
formula, which determines changes in the Scottish Office budget each year by
reference to changes in equivalent English spending plans, is under pressure in
any event and could not provide a basis for financing eventual English regional
government. The bill could aim to promote greater stability (and longer term
applicability throughout the UK) by specifying mechanisms for keeping the
funding formula under review and making adjustments when necessary.